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Abstract
Previously we found mechanical factors involving diffusion and fluid shear promote evolution of social behavior in
microbial populations [1]. Here, we extend this model to study the evolution of specialization using realistic physical
simulations of bacteria that secrete two public goods in a dynamic fluid. Through this first principles approach,
we find physical factors such as diffusion, flow patterns, and decay rates are as influential as fitness economics in
governing the evolution of community structure, to the extent that when mechanical factors are taken into account,
(1) Generalist communities can resist becoming specialists, despite the invasion fitness of specialization (2) Generalist
and specialists can both resist cheaters despite the invasion fitness of free-riding. (3) Multiple community structures
can coexist despite the opposing force of competitive exclusion. Our results emphasize the role of spatial assortment
and physical forces on niche partitioning and the evolution of diverse community structures.
Introduction
From subcellular structures to ecological communities, life is organized in compartments and modules performing
specific tasks. Organelles [2, 3], single [4] and multi-phenotype [5, 6] bacterial populations, tissues and organs in
multicellular organisms [7, 8], casts and social classes in colonial animals [9, 10], and guilds in ecological commu-
nities [11, 12, 13], all fulfill specialized roles that are vital for the functioning of the bigger whole. The evolution of
specialization also gives rise to cooperative metabolic interdependencies in microbial populations and can serve as a
strong mechanism for community assembly [14].
There are two classes of evolutionary forces moving a population from having one type of individual perform-
ing multiple functions –generalism–, towards one that has multiple types of individuals performing distinct functions
–specialism–. The first is “incompatible optimas” [15, 16, 17]: If a population must optimize two functions at once,
but if the two phenotypes optimizing these are incompatible, then the population will split into two phenotypes. For
example, the somatic and germ cells in volvox colonies are optimized for reproduction and motility. As a result, they
have entirely different positioning [18], morphology [19], and protein expression [20]. In multicellular cyanobacteria,
cells differentiate into carbon-fixating cells and nitrogen-fixating heterocysts [21]. E. coli can differentiate into tran-
sient non-growing cells and normally growing cells to hedge their bets across different environments [4]. A traveling
band of E. coli will exhibit a continuum of navigation styles, each specializing in processing different local conditions
while still moving in unison [6].
A second type of evolutionary pressure originates from the economies of scale. Undertaking one process at high
volume is more cost-effective than undertaking multiple processes at low volume. The morphological characteristics
necessary to accomplish two distinct functions require two investments in overhead. Specialization is then favored if
fitness returns are accelerated by further investment into a specific task [22, 23].
In a cooperating community, individuals that “cheat” by diverting resources away from public interest towards
self-interest will increase in numbers and eventually dominate the group, leading to a non-cooperative, unfit group.
This well-studied evolutionary instability is known as “tragedy of commons” [24, 25, 26, 27]. From an evolutionary
game theory perspective, a specialized community could be viewed as a collection of “semi-cheaters”, in the sense that
every sub-population secretes only a subset of the essential public goods but relies on others for the rest. Thus, from
game theoretical considerations alone, one might expect a similar tragedy-of-commons scenario, where specialists
always eventually dominate a population of generalists. How then should we explain the persistence of generalists in
nature, and even the coexistence of various combinations of generalists, specialists and cheaters within one niche?
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Evolution of specialization is typically studied in terms of fitness trade-offs or economic considerations. Special-
ization is shown to occur if relatedness is high and if fitness returns accelerate [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. The role of
conflicts within groups and spatial assortment is unknown.
Computational models that do consider spatial structure or finite group size, only do so phenomenologically,
abstracting away the underlying physics [23, 35, 36, 32, 37, 38, 35, 36]. While conceptually useful, such models do
not concern with how mechanical forces influence population dynamics and evolution.
Real-life microbial cooperation is mediated by secretions that diffuse and flow [39]. Extracellular enzymes digest
food [40, 41, 42], surfactants aid motility [43, 44], chelators scavenge metals [45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50], toxins fight
competitors and antagonists [51, 52, 53, 54, 55], virulence factors exploit a host [56, 57, 58, 59], and extracellular
polymeric substances provide sheltering [60, 61, 62]. Since cells must be within a certain distance to exchange such
services, spatial aggregation is often viewed as a prerequisite for multicellular specialization. Spatial effects are
known to have a major impact [63, 64, 65, 66], and multiple factors can couple together to influence the evolution of
cooperation in unexpected ways [67].
In this study, we find that mechanical factors such as diffusion lengths, molecular decay constants and fluid shear
forces play an important role in shaping the interaction structure of the community. We find, through first-principles
computer simulations and consistent analytical formulas, that microbes self-aggregate to form communities with spa-
tial structure. Contrary to game theoretic intuition, we find that generalist communities can resist specialization. More
remarkably, under suitable conditions, we observe that multiple types of community structures can coexist within the
same fluid niche. We also determine what physical properties make “socially inhabitable” niches, where free-riders
emerge, exploit and invariably destroy both generalist and specialist communities.
Any model aiming to describe evolution of functional specialization must include at least two functions, so that
sub-populations can potentially specialize to perform one function each. In the present model microbes can secrete
two public goods and a waste/toxin. These molecules diffuse, flow, and decay (cf. Figure 1). The specific assumptions
of our model can be enumerated as follows: (1) The system consists of microbes that can secrete two kinds of public
goods. A public good refers to a secretion that slows down the growth rate of the producer, but enhances others nearby.
(2) Every microbe secretes a waste molecule that curbs the growth of those nearby. (3) The secretions and bacteria
obey the physical laws of fluid dynamics and diffusion. (4) Whether a microbe secretes both, one, or none of the public
goods is hereditary, except for random mutations. However, every phenotype emits waste.
We study two models separately. (5) In one, which we call AND, access to both kinds of goods is necessary. In
the other, which we call OR, both goods contribute to fitness, but the lack of one can be compensated with the other.
Methods
Our work consists of (1) discrete, stochastic agent based simulations and (2) related continuous deterministic equa-
tions. In addition, to gain better analytical understanding, we construct (3) a simple effective model that captures the
essential details of (1) and (2).
Continuous Deterministic Equations
We construct equations governing the number density of three phenotypes n1(x, t), n2(x, t), n3(x, t) two chemical
secretions that are public goods c1(x, t), c2(x, t), and a waste compound c3(x, t), as a function of space x and time t.
n3(x, t) is the number density of microbes that secrete both kinds of public goods, to which we refer as “generalists”.
The microbes that secrete only public good number one or two, are denoted by n1(x, t) and n2(x, t), to which we
refer as “specialists”. Those that secrete no public goods are denoted by n0(x, t), to which we refer as “cheaters”.
n˙i =
(
db∇2 − v(x, t) ·∇+ fi(cα)
)
ni +
3∑
j=0
Mijnj , i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (1)
c˙α =
(
dα∇2 − v(x, t) ·∇− λα
)
cα +
3∑
i=0
Siαni, α = 1, 2, 3 (2)
Here indices i, j = 0, 1, 2, 3 label phenotypes, whereas the index α = 1, 2, 3 labels chemicals, i.e. the two public
goods and waste. Thus, Equation 1 and Equation 2 comprise 7 coupled spatiotemporal equations.
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Figure 1: Schematics and dynamics of microbe model. (a) Microbes cooperate by secreting public goods into their
environment. Generalists (large green circles) secrete two public goods (small yellow and red circles). Specialists
(large red and yellow circles) secrete only one of the two public goods. Cheaters (dark green) secrete none of the
public goods. All microbes secrete a metabolic waste (small blue circles). (b) Fitness contour plots and types of stable
groups in each fitness variant. In the top row, we plot the fitness contours as a function of public good concentrations c1
and c2. In the bottom row, we show the types of stable groups in each fitness form. The red line represents the contour
corresponding to zero fitness. In the AND case, the red line can never cross the c1, c2 axes, the fitness is negative
when either chemical is not present. Therefore the only types of stable groups are generalists or mixed specialists, as
shown in the bottom-left panel. In the OR case, the contours form straight lines. A decrease in one chemical is equally
compensated by an increase in the other chemical. The zero contour always crosses the c1, c2 axes. It is therefore
also possible to have pure specialist groups in the OR case, as shown in the bottom-right panel. (c) Evolutionary paths
between group types. Groups typically move towards less secretion since cheaters have higher invasion fitness than
specialists, who, being “half-cheaters”, have higher invasion fitness than generalists.
In both equations, the first two terms describe diffusion and advection. The flow field v(x, t) is a vector valued
function of space and time, and includes all information pertaining the flow patterns in the environment. In general,
it is obtained by solving separate fluid dynamics equations. Mutations between phenotypes and secretions of each
phenotype is governed by two matrices
Mij = µ

−2 1 1 0
1 −2 0 1
1 0 −2 1
0 1 1 −2
 , Siα =

0 0 sw
s1 0 sw
0 s2 sw
s1 s2 sw
 .
The secretion rate of chemical α by phenotype i is given by the matrix element Siα, and its decay rate by λα. The
mutation rate from phenotype j to i is given by Mij . The diagonal elements Mii indicate the rate at which phenotype
i mutates into a different category.
In our model, the secretion of public goods is binary, i.e. a good is either secreted or not. Mutations toggle on and
off with probability µ whether an individual secretes either public good. A mutation can cause a generalist to become
a specialist, but two mutations, one for each secretion function, are required for a generalist to become a cheater. Same
with back mutations.
The fitness function fi(cα) determines the growth rate of phenotype i. We consider two cases separately: when
both public goods are necessary for survival (AND) and when the public goods can substitute for one other (OR).
f
(AND)
i = a12
c1c2
c1c2 + k12
− aw c3
c3 + kw
−
2∑
α=1
βαSiα (3)
f
(OR)
i = a12
(c1 + c2)
(c1 + c2) + k12
− aw c3
c3 + kw
−
2∑
α=1
βαSiα (4)
As we see, in both cases, growth rate increases with the local concentration of public goods, c1, c2 and decreases with
3
the concentration of waste, c3. βα is the cost of secreting public good α, so that growth of phenotype i is curbed by an
amount proportional to its public good secretion. Note that waste is produced without any cost.
Note that with increasing concentration of goods, microbes receive diminishing returns. Similarly, with larger
waste, death rate approaches a maximum value. These functional forms are well understood, experimentally verified,
and commonly used in population dynamics models [68]. a’s and k’s are constants defining the initial slope and
saturation values of growth and death.
Discrete Stochastic Simulations
Our analytical conclusions (cf. Appendix 1) have been guided and supplemented by agent based stochastic simulations.
Videos of these simulations are provided in supplementary videos. Our simulation algorithm is as follows: at each
time interval, ∆t, the microbes (1) diffuse by a random walk with step size δ derived from the diffusion constant and a
bias dependent on the flow velocity, δ =
√
4db∆t+ v∆t, (2) secrete chemicals locally that then diffuse using a finite
difference scheme, and (3) reproduce or die with a probability dependent on their local fitness given by f(cα)∆t. If
f∆t is negative, the microbes die with probability 1, if f∆t is between 0 and 1 they reproduce an identical offspring
with probability f∆t. Upon reproduction, random mutations may alter the secretion rate of either public good –and
thus the reproduction rate– of the microbes. Mutations occur on each secretion function with probability µ and turn the
secretion of the public good on or off. The secretion rate is assumed to be heritable, and constant in time. Numerical
simulations for figures were performed by implementing the model described above using the Matlab programming
language and simulated using Matlab (Mathworks, Inc.). The source code for discrete simulations is provided as a
supplemental file. A summary of the system parameters is given in Table 1, along with typical ranges for their values
used in the simulations. The relevant ratios of parameters are consistent with those observed experimentally [69, 70].
Note also that the choice of parameters will be restricted to ensure a finite stable solution is possible. For example, we
enforce the quantity a12 − aw − 2βs12 < 0. This is because, if this quantity were positive, then a dense population
where the Hill terms in the fitness functions are saturated, will continue to have a positive fitness and grow indefinitely.
In the case where secretion rate and/or production cost are low, the waste term is crucial to ensure a finite carrying
capacity. We therefore choose aw ≥ a12. Other constraints on existence and stability are derived in our Turing analysis
(see Appendix 1).
Simple Effective Model
To gain better analytical understanding, we supplement our numerical results with an effective model given in Ap-
pendix 2. Our effective model is based on the observation that microbes aggregate into self-reproducing cooperative
groups. Different group types, rather than phenotypes, constitute the basic building blocks of our effective model;
and the fragmentation rates of these group types constitute the basic parameters of the model. These parameters are
“measured” from simulations and depend on the physical properties of the system. The results of our effective model
are compared to simulation results in Figure 3.
Results
Cooperative groups as Turing patterns
Through numerical simulations and analytical formulas, we see that the system gives rise to spatially segregated
cooperating groups in a certain parameter range, as shown in Figure 2. Spots or stripes in reaction diffusion systems
are known as Turing patterns, which form whenever an inhibiting agent diffuses faster than an activating agent. In our
model the inhibiting and activating agents are the waste and the public goods.
In general, the structure and size of these cooperating groups will vary with physical parameters. We show in Figure
2 how the pattern forming Turing domain varies with diffusion constants. Our analytical result, derived in Appendix
1, shown by the thick blue line, delineates the parameter space into pattern forming and non- pattern forming regions.
While simulations agree well with analytical results, we see some patterns slightly beyond the theoretical region. This
is due to the stochastic nature of the simulations which is known to widen the pattern forming region [71, 72].
In our simulations, we observe that cooperative groups of microbes, i.e. spots and stripes, grow and fragment,
thereby giving rise to new structures of the same type. These spatial structure of these patterns differ between gener-
alists and specialists, and therefore have a strong effect on the evolutionary trajectory of the system.
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Table 1: Summary of system parameters.
Parameter Definition Values for OR Values for AND
db Microbial diffusion constant 0.3906× 10−6 cm2 s−1 1.0× 10−6 cm2 s−1
d1 Public good 1 diffusion constant 5× 10−6 cm2 s−1 5× 10−6 cm2 s−1
d2 Public good 2 diffusion constant 5× 10−6 cm2 s−1 5× 10−6 cm2 s−1
dw Waste diffusion constant 15× 10−6 cm2 s−1 15× 10−6 cm2 s−1
λ1 Public good 1 decay constant 5.0× 10−3 s−1 5.0× 10−3 s−1
λ2 Public good 2 decay constant 5.0× 10−3 s−1 5.0× 10−3 s−1
λw Waste decay constant 1.5× 10−3 s−1 1.5× 10−3 s−1
k12 Public goods saturation 0.01 3× 10−5
kw Waste saturation 0.1 0.1
s1 Public good 1 secretion rate 5.0× 10−3 s−1 0.01 s−1
s2 Public good 2 secretion rate 5.0× 10−3 s−1 0.01 s−1
sw Waste secretion rate 0.01 s−1 0.09 s−1
a12 Benefit of public goods 7.5× 10−3 s−1 6.5× 10−3 s−1
aw Harm of waste compound 8.0× 10−3 s−1 10.5× 10−3 s−1
β1 Cost of secretion 1 0.01 to 0.26 0.01 to 0.15
β2 Cost of secretion 2 0.01 to 0.26 0.01 to 0.15
µ Mutation rate 5.0× 10−8 s−1 2.0× 10−7 s−1
Figure 2: Cooperative groups as Turing patterns In both the AND as well as the OR fitness type, microbes form
aggregate structures via a Turing instability. Here we show generalists for the AND case, similar results hold for the
OR case. The thick blue line gives the theoretical region of Turing instability, which agrees with computer simulations
see Appendix 1. The population can be homogeneous or form stripes or spots. These patterns can also grow and
fragment, forming new colonies. The diffusion constants are normalized by the bacterial diffusion constant, db =
1 × 10−6 cm2s−1. Secretion constants used are s1 = s2 = 0.015 s−1 and sw = 0.005 s−1, public good cost is
β = 0.1. The rest of the parameters are as given in Table 1.
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Effects of secretion cost on specialization
We next determine the roles of secretion cost βα, and flow shear on group structure and hence specialization. To see the
effect of trade-offs on specialization, we varied the cost of public good secretion and determined when specialization
occurs in both AND and OR fitness forms. To simplify our analysis, we set s1 = s2 = s. In order for both types of
specialists to then coexist, we also set β1 = β2 = β. Therefore, generalists pay an overall cost of 2β, specialists pay β,
and cheaters pay no cost. As such, a specialist mutant will invade a generalist group, and a cheater mutant will invade
a specialist group. In the absence of spatial structure and flow, the entire population will be dominated by cheaters and
will go extinct.
What can we say about the competition between different group types (as opposed to between different strains
within a group)? Since the fitness benefit per cost diminishes with larger secretion, one might expect that increasing
the cost of the goods would favor the specialists over generalists. Counterintuitively, we find the opposite. Specialist
groups indeed grow faster and form larger, expansive, and denser groups, which however are at once taken over by
mutants. In contrast, generalists form smaller, sparser, weaker groups that fragment often, which limits the spread of
mutants. Therefore, at higher cost β, the “weak” generalists are able to coexist and even dominate “strong” specialists
(Figure 3a,b).
In general, a large uniform population is more susceptible to invading mutants. In contrast, when the population is
organized as fragmenting patches, the community structure will prevail as long as the fragmentation rate is larger than
the invasive mutation rate. Thus, the type, size, growth and fragmentation of the groups ultimately dictates whether
generalism, specialism, or a coexistence of group types are evolutionarily stable.
Effect of flow patterns on specialization
A shearing fluid flow has been shown to modify social behavior by enhancing the group size and fragmentation rate
[1]. We therefore expect the shear rate to effect the types and sizes of groups that we see at steady state.
For constant shear we used a planar Couette flow, with velocity profile and shear rate given as,
v = vmax
y
H
xˆ,
∣∣∣∣dvdy
∣∣∣∣ = vmaxH ,
where vmax is the maximum flow rate and H is the height of the domain. We used periodic boundary conditions along
the left and right walls (xˆ direction), and Neumann boundary conditions for the top and bottom surfaces (yˆ direction).
The effect of shear is in general non-trivial and will depend on the group structure observed. We find that a shearing
flow enhances group fragmentation rate when a species forms distinct spot patterns and enlarges aggregates when they
are closer to forming stripes.
In Figure 3c,d we show the effect of shear at intermediate costs, where its effect is strongest. We found in both
cases that larger shear helps specialists by enhancing their fragmentation rate and enlarging generalist groups. Here,
fluid shear transitions the system from a generalist or coexisting state to a specialist state (Figure 3 - Video 2) . Thus,
fluid shear promotes specialization.
Since advective fluid flow is something that one can tune in an experimental or industrial setting, it is exciting
to think of possibilities where flow is used to control the social evolution of a microbial community. Furthermore,
since shear is in general spatially dependent, we can use different velocity profiles to localize this control to different
regions.
Combined effects of public good benefit, cooperation cost, and competition on evolution of
specialization
We study how varying public good benefit, production cost, and waste diffusion affect the stability of different com-
munity structures (Figure 4). We find in general, that higher waste diffusion and higher public good benefit helps
specialists and higher secretion cost favors generalists. The pie charts also show what conditions leads to coexistence
of different group types.
If waste diffusion is large, self-competition is lower, and specialists can form denser groups without over-polluting
themselves. They can then better utilize public goods secreted by their neighbors. If the public good benefit, a12, is
large, specialists also do better since secreting fewer public goods still gives a large benefit (Figure 4 - Video 1, Figure
4 - Video 2).
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Figure 3: Effects of cooperation cost and fluid shear on specialization. Points with error bars represent numerical
results averaged over 5 runs at simulation time T = 2 × 106 s in a domain of size 20 mm × 20 mm. Error bars
correspond to one standard deviation from the mean. Solid lines are from our effective theoretical model given in
Appendix 2. (a,b) In each fitness variant, we see that specialization and cheating is more abundant for low costs. At
lower costs, generalist groups are “too fit” and form large aggregate structures that are more susceptible to mutations.
At higher costs, we see generalists out-compete specialists, in the AND case (a), and coexist with specialists in the
OR case (b). At low costs, specialists again dominate. (c,d) Effects of fluid shear. A shearing flow causes groups
to fragment quicker and stripes to elongate and grow larger. (c) In the AND case, with secretion cost β = 0.12, we
observe that shear transitions the system from a coexisting state to a specialist state. Here, shear causes generalists
groups to elongate and become more susceptible to mutations and causes specialist groups to fragment quicker than
generalists. (d) In the OR case, at cost β = 0.17, shear again causes a transition from a coexisting state to a pure
specialist state. We therefore see in both cases that flow shear will promote specialization. Parameters not shown in
plots are given in Table 1.
Figure 3 - Video 1 Video shear stable generalists without flow in AND fitness form.
Figure 3 - Video 2 Video shear induced stable specialists in AND fitness form. Same system as video 1, with fluid
shear added.
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As we have already seen, specialization actually occurs more often when trade-offs are small, i.e. at smaller β. At
higher β, generalists are able to coexist with specialists and constitute the majority of the population (Figure 4 - Video
3, Figure 3 - Video 1)
We also see that can cheaters persist stably with the population when their invasion fitness is lower than the
growth rate of producers. This occurs in regions where producers do not form groups but grow either as stripes or
homogeneously in space, which happens when public good benefit is large and when secretion costs are low. In this
case, cheaters “chase after” producers, which grow into free space (Figure 4 - Video 4). High waste diffusion also helps
cheaters, since they are able to chase producers without over-polluting themselves or their hosts. When their invasion
fitness is about equal to the producer growth rate, cheaters take over fully, driving the population to extinction. When
the population aggregates into groups, cheater growth is limited to the group. Cooperation then prevails if groups
reproduce faster than cheaters emerge. This happens when secretion costs are large. Higher secretion costs can
therefore stabilize specialist populations against cheater invasion.
We see two regions of extinction: when public good benefit and waste diffusion are large, at medium costs; and
when public good benefit and waste diffusion are low, at high costs. The first case is due to cheaters taking over
groups, leading to the tragedy of the commons. Interestingly, this occurs more with higher public good benefit. The
population of producers becomes ”too fit” and more vulnerable to cheating mutations. For the second case, since costs
are high and benefits are low, microbes need to form dense groups to utilize enough goods to be stable. However, due
to the low waste diffusion, these groups over-pollute themselves and are no longer stable.
We see similar trends for both the AND and OR cases. The main distinction between the two being, for the OR
case, we predominately see pure specialist groups and only have mixed specialists in the AND case. We do not see
many mixed specialists in the OR case since mutations take over generalists groups quicker and stabilize as pure
groups, whereas in the AND case, pure groups would die out unless the complementary specialist also evolves in the
same group. The AND structure is therefore essential to have true division of labor, where each type of specialist
exists equally in the group.
Localization of specialization and coexistence in pipe and vortex flows
We next study the evolution of specialization in Hagen-Poiseuille and Rankine vortex flows. Again, we set the cost
parameter to a value where shear makes the biggest difference. As with the case with constant shear (Figure 3c,d), we
set for AND fitness, β = 0.12 and for OR fitness, β = 0.17. For a Hagen-Poiseuille flow in a two-dimensional pipe,
the flow rate and shear rate are given by,
v = vmax
(
1− y
2
H2
)
xˆ,
∣∣∣∣dvdy
∣∣∣∣ = 2vmaxyH2 .
From our results with a constant shear (Figure 3c,d), we expect higher shear regions of the pipe to be occupied by
specialists and lower shear regions to be occupied by generalists. However, we see the opposite to occur (Figure 5).
This is due to boundary and second order effects. Generalist groups on the boundary fragment more often, and longer
groups are formed in regions of intermediate shear (Figure 5 - Video 1). The fragmenting generalists groups act as a
source for specialists groups in the intermediate regions of the pipe. Near the center of the pipe where the shear rate
is low, groups do not fragment as quickly and are taken over by cheaters. We therefore see a coexistence of species
across the pipe, with generalists at the boundary, followed by specialists in the intermediate regions, and no one at the
center (Figure 5).
Next we study evolution in a Rankine vortex. The flow and shear profiles for a Rankine vortex with radius R and
circulation Γ are given by,
v =
{
Γr
2piR2 θˆ, r ≤ R
Γ
2pir θˆ, r > R
σ =
{
0, r ≤ R
Γ
2pir θˆ, r > R.
The distribution of specialists and generalists in the vortex agrees better with previous results from constant shear
(Figure 5). We see generalists persist in regions of low shear and specialists mainly reside in an annular region where
shear is large (supplementary video Figure 5 - Video 2).
In either case we see coexistence of different species across the full domain. The local shear profile dictates which
species is stable in each region. A varying shear profile can therefore allow for the coexistence of species across an
environment.
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Figure 4: Effects of waste diffusion, public good benefit, and cooperation cost on specialization. Pie charts give
the population ratios of generalists, specialists, and cheaters for varying secretion cost β, waste diffusion dw, and
public good benefit a12. Population values were obtained by taking a time average over 1 run for each parameter
value. The time average taken over time steps T = 1 × 106 s to T = 2 × 106 s. When waste diffusion is roughly
larger than the public good diffusion, the population can form spatial structures. Under certain conditions, we see
coexistence amongst all three – generalists, specialists, and cheaters. At medium costs, cheaters are able to take over
faster than groups reproduce, leading to extinction, seen as empty regions. At higher costs, specialists form smaller
groups that fragment quicker than cheaters take over and are stable at steady state. Specialists do better overall when
waste diffusion is large, since they can then form denser groups without over-polluting themselves. Higher public
good benefit, a12, also helps specialization, since secreting fewer public goods still gives a large benefit. Interestingly,
higher benefit also leads to more extinct states, since cheaters can take over quicker. These trends apply to both AND
and OR cases. Parameter values for a12, dw, and β are shown in the plots. Public good diffusion for the AND case is
d12 = 20× 10−6 cm2 s−1, for the OR case d12 = 25× 10−6 cm2 s−1; the rest of the parameters are as given in Table
1.
Figure 4 - Video 1 Video of stable specialists in AND fitness form.
Figure 4 - Video 2 Video of stable specialists in OR fitness form.
Figure 4 - Video 3 Video of generalist/specialist coexistence in OR fitness form.
Figure 4 - Video 4 Video cheaters coexisting in AND fitness form.
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Figure 5: Coexistence of specialists and generalists in pipes and vortices. The local shear profile dictates which
species is stable. When shear is spatially varying, we can get coexistence of generalists and specialists. (a) For
the AND case, in a pipe with Poiseuille flow, we see generalists residing at the boundaries followed by specialists
towards the middle. In the center where shear is lowest, cheaters are able to take over and destroy groups, leading
to extinction. (c) For the OR case, in a pipe, we see coexistence between generalists and specialists at the boundary
and specialists predominately in the center. The mutation rates used for the pipe are µ = 5 × 10−7 s−1 for the AND
case and µ = 5 × 10−8 s−1 for the OR case. (b,d) In a Rankine vortex flow, we see generalists where shear is
lowest, and specialists residing in an annulus where shear is at its maximum. The mutation rates used for the vortex
are µ = 3 × 10−7 s−1 for the AND case and µ = 5 × 10−8 s−1 for the OR case. Secretion costs used are β = 0.12
for the AND fitness, and β = 0.17 for the OR fitness. The rest of the parameters are as given in Table 1. Average pipe
population densities were obtained from averaging 5 runs in a domain of size 200 mm × 40 mm at a simulation time
of T = 2 × 106 s. Average vortex population densities were obtained from averaging 5 runs in a domain of size 60
mm × 60 mm also at a simulation time of T = 2× 106 s.
Figure 5 - Video 1 Video of evolution and coexistence in pipe for AND fitness.
Figure 5 - Video 2 Video of evolution and coexistence in vortex for AND fitness.
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Specialization: • Large waste diffusion: Larger waste diffusion lowers self-competition and allows specialists to
form denser groups to better utilize public goods secreted by neighbors.
• Large public good benefit: A high benefit for public goods allows specialists to still be fit without secreting
as many public goods. This also helps cheaters exploit producers.
• Lower secretion costs: A lower secretion cost can help specialists dominate over generalists, since a
smaller penalty for cooperation can make generalists “too fit”. In this case, large generalist structures are
easily taken over by specialist mutants.
• Group structure: Specialists from groups when waste diffusion is larger than public good diffusion and
when costs are not too low. When specialists do not form groups, they are easily taken over with cheaters,
leading to either “chasing cheaters” (Figure 4 - Video 4) or extinction. When generalists form smaller,
reproducing groups, they are able to escape take-over by specialists and out-compete specialists.
• Fitness type: The fitness type dictates which types of specialists structure we see – pure or mixed. In the
OR case, specialists generally evolve into structures of isolated types of specialists, see Figure 4 - Video 2
The AND structure is therefore essential to have true division of labor, where each type of specialist exists
equally in the group, see for example Figure 4 - Video 1.
Cheater coexistence: • Lack of group structure: Cheaters cannot exist on their own, but must “predate” on pro-
ducers – generalists or specialists. When producers are fit, and do not form groups, they can grow quicker
than cheaters fully taking over. This occurs when waste diffusion is large, and when secretion costs are
low.
• Small invasion fitness: When cheaters take over slower than producers reproduce, they are able to coexist.
This happens when secretion costs are low, since the advantage of not secreting is lower (Figure 4 - Video
4).
Extinction: • When cheaters take over: when the mutation rate and invasion fitness of cheaters large enough such
that they take over groups faster than they fragment. This happens when public good benefit is large and
waste diffusion is large, we see this in the right-middle regions of plots in Figure 4.
• When groups are not stable: When costs are large and public good benefit is low, cooperators need to
form denser groups to increase fitness. However, with low waste diffusion, denser groups over-pollute
themselves and are no longer stable. We see this in the top-left regions of plots in Figure 4.
Fluid shear: • Enhanced group fragmentation: A shearing flow stretches and distorts groups. It can help groups
fragment and reproduce quicker, allowing stability over cheating mutations [1].
• Enhanced specialization: Shearing flow can help specialist groups fragment quicker than generalist
groups, and therefore transition a population to contain more specialists (Figure 3 - Video 2).
• Coexistence of group types: The local shear rate can determine what groups are stable. A spatially varying
flow profile can then allow for coexistence of different community structures across the full fluid domain
(Figure 5 - Video 1, Figure 5 - Video 2).
Discussion
It is well known that spatial structure is key in the evolution of cooperation. By forming reproducing groups, organisms
are able to combat takeover by cheating mutants. In a similar vein, spatial structuring can have a large effect on the
evolution of specialization.
Previously we had found that mechanical factors involving diffusion and fluid shear can overcome tragedy of the
commons [1]. The mechanism gives rise to a variant of Simpson’s paradox [73] where individual groups may decrease
in sociality, but the population as a whole becomes more social. The present study is also based on the “evolution in a
fluid” model in [1], but with the addition of multiple kinds of public goods, to allow for functional specialization and
multiple kinds of community structures.
We have studied a physically realistic advection-diffusion system describing microbial growth and evolution.
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Through this first principles approach, we determined the effects of diffusion, public good benefit and production
cost, as well as flow patterns on the evolution of specialization. We showed that specialization is stable when a transi-
tion to specialization results in smaller, faster fragmenting groups or when it induces a discrete group structure from a
spatially homogeneous generalist state.
In nearly all studies of specialization, the basic mechanism is a trade off between different biological functions.
For example, the trade off between mobility and reproduction in volvox [74, 15]. Multicellular collectives are then
able to split these tasks amongst different components. We therefore expect that a larger cost in performing both
tasks should favor specialization. However, we find that specialization can occur when the trade-off is small, and
generalists can persist even when the trade-off is large. In this case, even though a transition to specialization may
afford a greater fitness gain, generalists are more evolutionarily stable since they form smaller groups that reproduce
quicker. Therefore, fitness gains cannot completely determine when specialization will occur; geometric effects, flow
and physical forces can outweigh these fitness gains.
We saw that fluid flow can alter the group structure. A shearing flow can increase group size and group fragmen-
tation rates, and therefore change the evolutionary stability of a community structure. When the shear profile varies
over space, as in a Hagen-Poiseuille or Rankine vortex flow, we see a coexistence of generalists and specialists. We
therefore view the evolution of division of labor as a mechanical phenomena, where the physics of the media dictates
the evolutionary stability of its inhabitants. With this perspective, media can be engineered to control the evolution of
biological systems to fit our desired application.
Many authors view undifferentiated multicellularity as a prerequisite for specialization [75, 35, 76, 21, 28]. In
the case where generalists form a spatially homogeneous population and specialists form groups, we have seen that
a transition to specialization can induce a group structure. These groups may then further specialize and develop
individuality and germ-soma specialization. In this case, division of labor can be viewed as a driver of multicellularity,
rather than just a consequence. Our findings emphasize the spatial and physical mechanisms for the evolution of
multicellularity.
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Appendix 1
To understand how each type of species competes evolutionarily with the other, we solve for Turing patterns formed
in each state, in the absence of mutations. By performing a linear Turing analysis on each system, we determine the
regions in phase space where patterns form.
We study the Turing patterns of stable systems of generalists and specialists in both AND and OR fitness forms.
Generalist Turing analysis
For generalists, we linearize the following system
n˙3 = db∇2n3 + n3f3(cα)
c˙1 = d1∇2c1 − λ1c1 + s1n3
c˙2 = d2∇2c2 − λ2c2 + s2n3
c˙3 = dw∇2c3 − λwc3 + swn3.
Next, we make the further simplification setting d1 = d2 = d, λ1 = λ2 ≡ λ and s1 = s2 ≡ s, treating both public
goods symmetrically. With this simplification, we can set c1 = c2 ≡ c12 , and reduce the system to three equations.
We then have, for the fitness functions,
f
(AND)
3 = a12
c212
c212 + k12
− aw c3
c3 + kw
− 2βs,
f
(OR)
3 = a12
2c12
c12 + k12
− aw c3
c3 + kw
− 2βs.
We denote by g∗ = (n∗3, c
∗
12, c
∗
3) the homogeneous steady state solution, given by setting the reaction terms to zero,
n∗3f3(c
∗
α) = 0, sn
∗
3 − λc∗12 = 0, swn∗3 − λwc∗3 = 0.
The steady state value for the chemicals are then given by,
c∗12 =
s
λ
n∗3, c
∗
3 =
sw
λw
n∗3.
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The solution for n∗3 depends on the form of the fitness function. In the AND case, n
∗
3 is given by solving the qubic
equation,
s2sw
λ2λw
(a12 − aw − 2βs)n33 +
kws
2
λ2
(a12 − 2βs)n23 −
k12sw
λw
(aw + 2βs)n3 − 2βk12kws = 0.
We enforce a12− aw − 2βs < 0 for stability, otherwise the dense state will become unstable as the hill forms become
saturated. Since the linear and constant coefficients are also negative, by Descartes rule of signs, in order to have any
positive solution, we need a12 − 2βs > 0. This implies we have up to two positive solutions, since there are two sign
changes.
In the OR case, we have n∗3 given by solving the quadratic equation,
2ssw
λλw
(a12−aw−2βs)n23 +
1
λλw
[2a12kwλws−awk12λsw − 2βs(2kwλws+ k12λsw)]n3 − 2βk12kws = 0
For this to have a positive solution, we require
2a12kwλws− awk12λsw − 2βs(2kwλws+ k12λsw) > 0.
Next we perform a linear stability analysis for each case. We let g ≡ (n3, c12, c3)T − g∗, be a perturbation from
the steady state. Our linearized system then looks like,
∂
∂t
g = Ag,
where our stability matrix A is given as
A =
 0 f,12 f,ws −λ 0
sw 0 −λw
 .
Here f,12 and f,w, in each case, are given by
f
(AND)
,12 =
2a12k12c12
(c212 + k12)
2
∣∣∣∣
c∗12
,
f
(OR)
,12 =
2a12k12
(2c12 + k12)2
∣∣∣∣
c∗12
,
f (AND),w = f
(OR)
,w = −
awkw
(c3 + kw)2
∣∣∣∣
c∗3
.
The characteristic polynomial is given in terms of the invariants of a 3× 3 matrix,
Λ3 − tr(A)Λ2 + 1
2
((tr(A))2 − tr(A2))Λ− det(A) = 0
Again, using Descartes rule of signs, we have the following requirements for linear stability, and with the knowledge
that tr(A) is negative, we require
det(A) < 0
(tr(A))2 − tr(A2) > 0.
Next we include diffusion and look for a Turing instability. We expand our solution in terms of Fourier modes with
exponential growth,
g(x, t) =
∑
k
cke
ik·xeΛ(k)t.
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Plugging this into our linearized system, we get the eigenvalue equation, (−k2D +A)g = Λg. Where,
D =
db 0 00 d 0
0 0 dw
 .
If we denote by M(k) = −k2D +A, the characteristic equation for this system is now given as
Λ(k)3 − tr(M(k))Λ2 + 1
2
[
(tr(M(k)))2 − tr(M(k)2)]Λ(k)− det(M(k)) = 0
We now use Descartes rule of signs once again, this time to get an instability. First, we have tr(M) = −k2tr(D) +
tr(A) < 0, which makes the quadratic term positive. For the linear term, we have
(tr(M(k)))2 − tr(M(k)2) = [−k2tr(D) + tr(A)]2 − tr([−k2D +A]2)
= k4(tr(D))2 − 2k2tr(D)tr(A) + (tr(A))2 − [k4tr(D2)− k2tr(DA)− k2tr(AD) + tr(A)2]
= k4[(tr(D))2 − tr(D2)] + (tr(A))2 − tr(A2) + k2[tr(DA) + tr(AD)− 2tr(D)tr(A)].
Now since (tr(D))2 − tr(D2) = (db + d + dw)2 − d2b + d2 + d2w > 0, tr(DA) + tr(AD) − 2tr(D)tr(A) =
2(dwλ + d12λw + db(λ + λw)) > 0, and we require (tr(A))2 − tr(A2) > 0 from linear stability, the linear term is
also positive. Therefore, by Descartes rule of signs, the requirement for Turing instability reduces to,
det(−k2D +A) > 0,
for some range of k > 0.
Inspecting this further, we see that det(−k2D+A) gives a cubic polynomial in k2 which goes to negative infinity
as k → ∞ and passes through det(A) < 0 at k = 0. We therefore see that a Turing instability begins when the
local maximum of Ψ(k2) = det(−k2D + A) vanishes. We therefore have that the critical wavenumber is given by
maximizing Ψ(k2). Let w = k2, then
Ψ(w) = −det(D)w3 − (dbdwλ+ dbdλw)w2
+ (dfwsw − dbλλw + dwf,12s)w + det(A).
The local maximum is then given by taking dΨdw = 0 and taking the positive root,
w∗ =
−b−√b2 − 4ac
2a
,
where a = 3det(D), b = 2(df,wsw − dbλλw + dwf,12s), c = det(A). Given the critical value w∗ and a public good
diffusion d, we can find the critical waste diffusion that gives a Turing instability by setting Ψ(w∗, dc3) = 0 and solving
for dc3. This then gives a relation for d
c
3 as a function of the other system parameters, when it exists. The theoretical
region of Turing instability is compared against numerical results in Figure 2.
Specialist Turing analysis
The specialist case can be treated in a similar manner. Here we take n3 = 0 and because of symmetry, take n1 = n2 ≡
ns. We therefore again reduce our system to three equations and get the following system,
n˙s = db∇2ns + nsf(cα)
c˙12 = d∇2c12 − λc12 + sns
c˙3 = dw∇2c3 − λwc3 + 2swns
The factor of 2 in the waste chemical term comes from the fact that both populations n1 and n2 secrete waste while
only one secretes the public good. We also have that the factor of 2 in front of the cost in the fitness functions now
becomes a one. We therefore have the same results as in the generalist case with the substitutions,
n3 → ns, 2β → β, sw → 2sw.
With these substitutions, the results from the generalists case applies also to the specialists. In general, the Turing
domain will be different for the two states. These differing Turing regions and pattern types effect what type of state,
generalist or specialist, will be more stable evolutionarily when also considering mutations.
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A Appendix 2
Effective group models
To get a better understanding of the results in Figure 3, we developed an effective model of ordinary differential
equations describing the dynamics of each type of group. We assume that each type of species, generalists and
specialists, form groups that grow and reproduce with different rates. The growth of the groups are given by a logistic
equation, with a carrying capacity dependent on the domain. In order to fully describe the logistic growth, we also
need to include transient states that are not stable but are continuously formed. The transient states therefore restrict
the space in which the stable states are allowed to grow. We denote generalists groups by G. Groups composed of
generalists and specialists are transitioning to a specialist state and are denoted by T . Mixed specialist groups made
of microbes that secrete different public goods are represented by M . Pure specialists groups composed of microbes
secreting only one public good are denoted by P . Pure specialist groups only occur in the OR case, and we exclude
them in our effective model for the AND case. Finally, groups with cheaters that secrete no public good are denoted
by C. The evolutionary paths the groups can take are illustrated in Figure 1c.
Effective model for AND type fitness
The group dynamics for the AND case are described by the following set of equations,
G˙ = rg [1− Σ/k]G− (1/2)mgµG, (5)
T˙ = −rtT + (1/2)mgµG− (1/2)mtµT, (6)
M˙ = rm [1− Σ/k]M − (1/2)mmµM + (1/2)mtµT, (7)
C˙ = −rcC + (1/2)mmµM, (8)
where the constants mi correspond to the number of microbes in a group of type i, and Σ = mgG+mtT +mmM +
mcC is the total population. The rates ri give the reproduction rates for stable groups and the death rates for transient
groups. The carrying capacity for the system is given by k. Mutations cause groups to go down in number of secreted
compounds (Figure 1c), and are given by terms proportional to the mutation rate µ. Back mutations do not stick in
groups since they are paying more cost than their neighbors, and so we neglect transitions towards secreting more
goods. The factor of 1/2 in front of mutation terms is due to mutations not always sticking in a group before it splits
in two. The parameter values were obtained by fitting logistic growth curves to simulations without mutations to
determine the natural growth of an isolated species.
By setting (Equation 5 -Equation 8) to zero, we obtain the steady state values for each type of group. The possible
steady states are the trivial extinct state, where all group populations vanish, a stable state of mixed specialists and
cheaters, and a stable state where all species coexist. The specialist/cheater state is given by,
M∗ =
krc(2rm − µmm)
µmcmmrm + 2mmrcrm
C∗ =
kµ(2rm −mm)
2µmcrm + 4rcrm
In the stable state where all group types coexist, the number of generalists groups is given by,
G∗ =
krc(2rg − µmg)(µmg + 2rt)(mgrm −mmrg)
mgrg[2µrc
(
m2grm −mgmmrg +mgmtrm − 2mmmtrg
)
+ 4rcrt(mgrm −mmrg)− µ2mcmmmtrg]
For this to be positive, the generalists group reproduction rate must satisfy,
µmg
2
< rg <
rmmg
mm
.
The other species can be given from the ratios,
T ∗
G∗
=
µmg
µmg + 2rt
,
M∗
G∗
=
µmgmtrg
(µmg + 2rt)(mmrg −mgrm) ,
C∗
G∗
=
µ2mgmmmtrg
2rc(µmg + 2rt)(mmrg −mgrm) .
We plot the results of our effective model as solid curves against simulation results (Figure 3) and get good overall
agreement with the numerical simulations. At low costs (β), microbes form stripes or become homogeneous, and the
groups structure assumption of our effective model breaks down.
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Effective model for OR type fitness
In the OR case, pure specialist groups are now stable. Since we treat both chemicals symmetrically, and since the
chemicals enter additively in the fitness function, pure specialist and mixed specialist groups are equivalent. However,
to form a mixed specialist state, opposite mutations are needed within the lifetime of a generalist group. Since tran-
sition states are no longer unstable, once a mutation occurs in a generalist group, it quickly stabilizes to a specialist
group. With these considerations, we build and solve an effective model only including generalists, pure specialists,
and cheaters. The effective model is described by the following dynamical equations,
G˙ = rg [1− Σ/k]G− (1/2)mgµG (9)
P˙ = rp [1− Σ/k]P − (1/2)mpµP + (1/2)mgµG (10)
C˙ = −rcC + (1/2)mpµP (11)
Setting (Equation 9 - Equation 11) to zero to get steady states, we again get two non-trivial solutions. One with only
specialist and cheating groups, and one where all three coexist. For the solution with only specialists and cheaters, we
get
P =
krc(2rp − µmp)
µmcmprp + 2mprcrp
, C =
kµ(2rp − µmp)
2µmcrp + 4rcrp
.
For the solution where all three coexist, we get for the generalists,
G∗ =
krc(2rg − µmg)(mgrp −mprg)
mgrg(2mgrcrp − µmcmprg − 4mprcrg) .
The other groups are given by taking the ratios,
P ∗
G∗
=
mgrg
mprg −mgrp ,
C∗
G∗
=
µmgmprg
2mprcrg − 2mgrcrp .
We plot the results of our effective model in the OR case against simulation results (Figure 3) and again get a good
overall agreement with the numerical simulations.
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